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Abstract: This work, “The Nothingness” of the Gettier  Problem is an attempt to deconstruct the 
popularly held view that a fourth condition may be necessary for the Traditional Account of 
Knowledge otherwise known as JTB. Plato, it was  who championed the traditional account of 
knowledge as justified Belief in  response to the agitation of the skeptics notably Georgias and 
Protagoras. This tripartite account held sway until Edmund Gettier Challenged the position with his 
article “Is Jus tified True Belief Knowledge?” Since this challenge, scholars have tried to s olve what 
has become known as the Gettier Problem by trying to fashion out a fourth condition to JTB. This 
work argues that the celebrated Gettier counter -examples in the challenge of the tripartite account 
is a "nothingness". The traditional account is ra ther fundamental in knowledge claim, hence any 
new vista in form of additional information on JTB should not invalidate it. The textual analysis was 
adopted as a method for this research.   
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The question of the impossibility of 
knowledge was sparked by the skeptics 
in their attack on the nature and 
justification of claims to knowledge. Over 
the periods in philosophy, scholars have 
in various ways tried to find avenues to 
make the foundations for knowledge 
claims firm noting that if the skeptic 
doubt is allowed to hold sway, it will 
undermine the total foundation of 
knowledge. In doing this, philosophers 
have embarked upon the analysis of 
what constitutes knowledge by trying to 
identify the basic criteria for knowledge 
claim. It is not out of place therefore to 
conclude that skepticism was the 
background for the search for necessary 
conditions of knowledge. A notable 
skeptic of antiquity was Gorgias who 
took the skeptical attitude to an extreme. 
His position is different from that of 
Protagoras in that while the truth is 
relative to the individual and the 
circumstances, for Gorgias there is 
nothing like truth at all (Pratt 2015). For 
Gorgias, human beings communicate 
with words, but these words are mere 
symbols, and that there can be no on-on-
one correspondence between words and 
what they represent. In this regard, 
knowledge can neither be achieved nor 
can it be communicated (Stumph 2002, 
pp. 33). 
As seen above, the different 
opinions held by the skeptics led to many 
different ethical and political standards. 
At this point, Plato in a bid to produce 
incorruptible citizens for the state of 
Athens developed a theory of knowledge 
that was to counter skepticism and moral 
relativism. Here, it is reasoned that a 
proper analysis of the nature of 
justification of our knowledge claims 
would be a pre-condition for the 
articulation of other philosophical 
claims. 
Plato’s analysis is trying to provide 
a foundation and criterion for knowledge 
to counter the skeptics explains that if a 
belief is true and can be justified, it 
automatically qualifies to be referred to 
as knowledge. This approach gave 
impetus to what has become known as 
JTB (Justifiable True Belief). This is the 
traditional account of knowledge and 
became accepted generally by most 
philosophers and scholars in the field of 
Epistemology. As accepted by 
philosophers, this traditional definition 
was challenged by Gettier in a three-page 
article, “Is Justified True-Belief 
Knowledge” in 1963. Arguing that JTB is 
inadequate for knowledge, Gettier was of 
the view that one could have a justified 
true belief and yet does not have 
knowledge. Several reactions both for 
and against have trailed this position, 
leading to the Gettier problem in 
philosophy (Demin 2019). 
With the Gettier challenge, 
scholars have reasoned the need for the 
fourth condition to JTB, but this paper 
submits that Gettier has rather brought 
in skepticism in another form hence any 
new twist to JTB enriches rather than 
destroys it. 
 
THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
As noted earlier, what is today 
known as the traditional account (JTB) 
was an attempt to respond to the 
skeptical challenge on the possibility of 
knowledge. As a result of the fact that the 
account goes by three parts, it is 
sometimes referred to as the "tripartite" 
definition or the tripartite account 
(Dancy: 1981, pp. 23). This account holds 
that three core conditions must be 
fulfilled for any claim to be considered as 
knowledge. These conditions were 
brought up in the THEATUS, one of 
Plato’s dialogues, where his description 
of knowledge entails that knowledge is 
justified true belief. In this regard, Plato 
submits; 
Where anyone forms the true 
opinion of anything without rational 
explanation, you may say that his mind is 
truly exercised, but has no knowledge for 
he who cannot give and receive a reason 
for a thing has no knowledge of that 
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thing, but he who adds the rational 
explanation, then he is perfect in 
knowledge… True opinion combined 
with definition or rational explanation, is 
knowledge (1990, pp. 545) 
From the analysis, as shown above, 
Plato aptly made a distinction between 
an option and true knowledge as the 
latter is followed with some rational 
explanation. It is this rational angle to an 
opinion that epistemologists refer to as 
justification. 
In support of the foregoing 
analysis, Hetherington has this to posit; 
"a true belief is not knowing if it is the 
result of guesswork. To be knowledge, it 
must be justified by, for example, 
appropriate evidence (2005, pp. 21). The 
trust of the traditional account of 
knowledge is that propositional 
knowledge constitutes three basic 
conditions. To this end, it can only be 
concluded that Mr. X knows a 
proposition P, if and only if;  
a. P is true 
b. X believes that P is true 
c. X is justified in believing that P is true 
The implication here is that 
knowledge requires not only that our 
beliefs be true, but also that we have a 
good rational explanation to be justified 
in believing them to be true. Thus 
knowledge is justified true belief 
according to the traditional account. The 
three features are therefore not only 
necessary but are sufficient conditions 
for knowledge. The traditional account of 
knowledge held sway and enjoyed 
popular appeal until it was challenged by 
Gettier in his work, “Is Justified True 
Belief Knowledge?” 
 
THE GETTIER EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
QUAGMIRE 
In his highly influential paper, “Is 
justified true belief knowledge?”, Gettier 
presents two thought experiments 
otherwise known as counter-examples to 
suggest that there was a fundamental 
problem with the traditional account of 
knowledge which was brought forward 
by Plato to counter the skeptics. These 
thought experiments seem to show that 
JTB was inadequate for knowledge by 
proving that someone could have a 
justified true belief and also lack 
knowledge. 
Because the Gettier counter-examples 
share the same logical construct and 
structure, it is expedient to consider only 
one of the thought experiments here, in 
this case, "Gettier’s job seekers”, For 
Gettier, 
 
Suppose that two people, Smith 
and Jones have applied for a job. 
Suppose that Smith has a justified 
belief that Jones will get the job. 
The evidence for it is high enough 
that Smith justifiably beliefs it, 
might be that the president of the 
company assured him that Jones 
would in the end be selected 
(1963, pp. 121). 
 
In furtherance of this narrative; 
Smith also believes (and indeed knows 
that Jones has ten coins in his pocket, 
which is true and is demonstrated to 
him, possibly by Jones counting them 
himself. From this, he believes the logical 
consequence of these beliefs, that the 
man who will get the job has ten coins in 
his pocket. 
Gettier brings his thought 
experiment to the crucial point when he 
implores us to suppose further that; 
It turns out that Smith was wrong, 
and that, for some unforeseeable reason, 
it turns out that Smith gets the job, and 
Jones does not. It also turns out that 
Smith has ten coins in his pocket, though 
he didn’t realize it. The question is, was 
Smith’s belief that, the man who will get 
the job has ten coins in his pocket 
knowledge? 
Gettier counter-examples essentially 
follow the same structure;   
a. Smith justifiably believes that P 
b. P is false 
c. Smith correctly infers that if P is true, 
then Q is true 
d. So Smith believes that Q, justifiably 
e. Q is true, but not because of P 
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f. So, Smith has a justified true belief 
that Q  
The flaws arise from forming an 
inference based on a false premise, 
though there is sufficient evidence to 
believe that premise is true. 
 The Gettier counter-example as 
enunciated shows that, Smith had a 
justified true belief, yet does not know. 
This is the case because his knowledge 
was a mere coincidence as he arrived at a 
true proposition based on facts that were 
not relevant to the truth of the 
proposition (Schick & Vaughan: 1999, pp. 
430). 
From the foregoing, it is not out of 
place to draw a line out of the thought 
experiments to the extent that any 
knowledge claim should not be based on 
guesswork and coincidence, but rather 
on a guarantee of sufficient evidence. 
This is to the extent to which the Gettier 
counter-examples can go. From the 
analysis -made so far, scholars and 
philosophers have since Gettier 
published his famous but contentious 
1963 article, tried to think out of the box 
towards the addition of the fourth 
condition to JTB, redefine to do away 
with the independence of the conditions 
or a claim that they do not meet the 
justification requirement. However, the 
popular acclaim has been to modify the 
JTB to reach a capable "Gettier-proof” 
epistemic theory of knowledge 
(Abbasian 2012, pp. 108). The quest to 
address the challenge posed by the 
counter-examples of Edmund Gettier in 
his article has been variously referred to 
as “The post Gettier analysis of 
knowledge or the search for the fourth 
condition of knowledge.  
 
THE GETTIER PROBLEM: “A 
NOTHINGNESS” 
 As have been pointed out from 
the previous analysis, the Traditional 
Account of Knowledge also known as the 
Tripartite account was called to question 
by Edmund Gettier. With this X-ray, 
Gettier was to open a new frontier in the 
domain of Epistemology. The defect 
identified in the tripartite account of 
knowledge has since become known as 
“The Gettier problem”. 
 A major outlook of philosophical 
enterprise is the fact that, the answers 
provided by any particular philosopher is 
not usually seen as what is fundamental, 
but that the questions and answers are 
attempted at all. In this regard, the 
various attempts by scholars to address 
the Gettier problem have had their own 
defects. Going forward, therefore, it is the 
position of this paper that, the 
significance of the counter-examples is 
limited, leading to a misunderstanding of 
the JTB definition, hence the Gettier 
problem is a “nothingness”. In fact, as 
used by Jean-Paul Sarte, “nothingness” 
plays an important role in shaping who 
we are and what we can know (Depestre 
2007). 
It is a known fact that every time 
we make a choice we have to envisage 
that which does not yet exist. In other 
words, I have to imagine that I am now 
the professor of what I contemplate to 
purchase. What I am thinking about at 
the moment is not what already exists 
but what has been and is no more (the 
past) and what I might bring about by my 
daily choices (the future). Both of these 
scenarios have the character of 
“nothingness”. 
In everything we do, we look to 
nothing. I am hungry - I intend 
something which does not at 
present exist; my eating a meal. I 
think of the next word to type on 
the keyboard, at the moment of 
thinking it, it does not yet exist. We 
are always aiming at that which we 
are not, at the nothing which is 
future, while influenced by our 
own personal history, the 
“nothing” which is past (Rodgers & 
Thompson 2011, pp. 38). 
 
At any one moment, human beings 
can turn their attention from what is to 
what might likely be. Here we are 
concerned with that which does not at 
this present moment exist, that is a 
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“nothingness” that surrounds the present 
existing moment. 
The same scenario painted above 
is equally true of knowledge acquisition. 
The knowledge that one had in the past 
is knowledge as that goes, hence 
additional information in that regard is 
an added advantage and should not 
diminish the tripartite account of 
knowledge. Knowledge requires JTB 
fundamentally but any future input of 
additional evidence should not defeat the 
knowledge justification. Knowledge 
exists as justified true belief is always 




It is obvious from the narrative 
done so far that the search for an 
appropriate characterization of the 
nature of knowledge is quite a task. This 
quest has engaged philosophers' 
attention from time beginning with 
Plato's tripartite account of knowledge to 
the present. As indicated in this work, the 
JTB account of knowledge is fundamental 
in our definition of knowledge hence the 
famous Gettier problem is a 
“nothingness”. The conditions for 
“Justified True Belief” recognize the 
major concerns of epistemologists in 
their claim to knowledge. In this regard, 
it is a given that the quest for an 
indubitable knowledge is an ever-
evolving one, a “nothingness” waiting to 
be always filled by man’s daily activities 
and choices. At any time new vistas are 
added, to any knowledge claim, it should 
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